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In this essay, the author examines some of the troubled interactions between science and
religion in the West, attributing part of the trouble to a reliance upon anthropomorphic models
ofGod and to an illusion ofhuman separatenessfrom the rest ofcreation. Citing recentfindings
ofbiology, neuroscience, and cognitive science, he argues that the human species is religious by
its very nature.
Introduction
When I consider your heavens, the work of
your fingers,
the moon and the stars, which you have set
in place,
what are human beings that you are mindful
of them,
mortals that you care for them?
Yet you have... crowned them with glory
and honor.
--Psalm 8:3-5
The psalmist's question springs from a
sense of wonder, occasioned by contempla-
tion of the starry fields in their vastness and
beauty. An answer is woven from the
threads of God's majesty, the puzzle of
human existence, and the order of the
cosmos. All three elements play upon each
other and find their meaning in relation to
each other. Likewise, the most satisfying
answers we give ourselves about the
meaning of human existence flow from our
investigation of the world in which we live,
and are bracketed by a sense of the mysteri-
ous, majestic, otherness of God.
"Nearly all the wisdom we possess,"
writes John Calvin, "consists of two parts:
the knowledge of God and of ourselves. But
while joined by many bonds, which one
precedes and brings forth the other is not
easy to discern." ' What can we learn about
God through scientific exploration of
ourselves and the world around us? Surely a
methodological approach to increasing our
knowledge of God, apart from the study of
Scripture, must focus on increasing knowl-
edge of ourselves and our world, for God is
not an object among objects nor a cause
among causes. Growth in our knowledge of
God does not occur as does progress in
"normal" science. 2 Rather, our knowledge
of God functions more like a theoretical
construction, organizing our experience,
informing the meaning we find and attribute
to human existence, and ordering our
relation to the cosmos and to each other. 3
The findings and theories of science can
either confirm the adequacy of a religious
worldview as an intelligent, coherent, and
comprehensive view of ourselves and our
world, or can display the weakness of our
conception of God to account for all
phenomena.
A view from the Reformed tradition
Four themes recurrent in the Reformed
tradition shape my perspectives and inform
my disposition towards the sciences: God's
otherness, human creatureliness, life's
religiousness, and a desire to relate all things
to a unifying reference. 4 5 I propose that
anyone, working from a perspective
informed by these four themes, may benefit
from, and dialogue with, other scientific
disciplines in several ways. I argue that the
findings and perspectives of the physical and
human sciences can enrich the meaning of
the first three themes by correcting the too-
often closed and limited understanding of
the nature of God, confirm convictions
about the wonders and limits of creaturely
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existence, and corroborate the irreformably
religious character of all human acts of
meaning-making. The fourth theme, that of
a unifying vision, I believe, dictates a
disposition of openness, humility and
wonder.
a. God's otherness
Different thinkers have expressed the
otherness of God in various ways. Calvin
meditates on the absolutely sovereign
Governor who rules all parts of the uni-
verse.
6 Edwards savors the sweet glory that
appears in all things as expressions of his
"great and glorious God" 7 Schleie'rmacher
identifies God as the
"Whence" of our exist-
ence, upon which we sense
ourselves as absolutely
dependent. 8 Augustine
perhaps best indicates the
otherness of God in the
following: "We are
speaking of God. Is it any wonder that thou
dost not comprehend? For if thou dost
comprehend, He is not God.... [T]o reach
God by the mind in any measure is a great
blessedness; but to comprehend Him is
altogether impossible." 9
b. Our creatureliness
As creatures we are aware that we have
not called ourselves into being; we belong to
something much greater than ourselves, and
our existence is intertwined with the fabric
of the natural order. Our creatureliness
speaks to the relative significance of our
existence and to the limited perspective of
our understanding. This limits our ability to
know God. It also limits our knowledge of
ourselves. 10 Augustine cries in his Confes-
sions, "I myself cannot grasp the totality of
what I am. Is the mind, then, too restricted
to compass itself. . . ?" "
Yet, our creatureliness also suggests a
degree of dignity resulting from the imprint
of the Creator's image. It is our status as
image-bearers that allows us to comprehend
the intelligibility in the world and to respond
in gratitude to its Author. That our minds
can calculate probability waves of sub-
atomic particles, that we can trace the
Universe's history in cosmic radiation, that
we can relieve mental anguish through
pharmacological therapy, all speak not only
of the wonderfully intelligible patterns in
nature, but also-and more surprisingly-of
our uncanny ability to perceive it. The
wonder inspired by the human body and our
ability to measure the universe point, in turn,
to the character of the Creator. "In regards
to the structure of the human body, one must
have the greatest keenness in order to weigh
its articulation, symmetry, beauty and use,"
writes Calvin; "but as all acknowledge, the
It is our status as image-bearers that
allows us to comprehend the intelligibility
in the world and to respond in gratitude to
its Author.
human body shows itself to be a composi-
tion so ingenious that its Artificer is rightly
judged a wonder worker." " As Einstein
said, "In every true searcher of nature there
is a kind of religious reverence; for he finds
it impossible to imagine that he is the first to
have thought out the exceedingly delicate
threads that connect his perceptions." ,2
c. Life's religiousness
"He who rejects one religion (or god)
can only do so in the name of another,"
writes Cherbonnier. 1 - That humans are
irreformably religious is a recurrent theme in
the Reformed tradition. Calvin, with all of.
Augustine's concern for concrete issues,
insisted that there is no neutral ground from
which to contemplate the meaning of life.
Reinhold Niebuhr writes: "Implicit in the
human situation of freedom and in man's
capacity to transcend himself and his world
is his inability to construct a world of
meaning without finding a source and key to
the structure of meaning which transcends
the world beyond his own capacity to
transcend it.".15
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d. A unifying vision
A great contribution of the Reformers
was their insistence on including all areas of
life within the purview of religious con-
cerns. Religion can no longer be viewed as
a personal matter of one's supernatural end,
super-added to the self-sufficient spheres of
science and society. One's religious
commitments must inform one's public life.
And, likewise, what one encounters in the
physical and social worlds must register in
one's religious commitments. An absolutely
sovereign God assures ultimate harmony
among all elements of human existence.
Behind this concern is the ancient notion
that God is the one author of two great
books: Scripture and nature. 6
The desire for a unifying vision of all
human experience suggests several things -
for theology's dialogue with the sciences.
First, we should not hesitate to look closely
at the physical world, out of fear of what we
may find. Neither should we be too certain
in advance of what we might find. The
Galileo affair was a lesson in the cost of
suppressing acknowledgment of the contin-
gencies of nature in the name of religious
preconceptions. Second, growth in our
knowledge of ourselves and consequently
our knowledge of God, comes through
humbly listening, looking, feeling and
pondering. And finally, to benefit from our
dialogue with nature, we must be willing to
feel, as well as to think. Full understanding
emerges only when the cool dispassion of
controlled investigation is coupled with the
drive of curiosity, the wonder of being, the
excitement of discovery, and the response of
gratitude.
Such a disposition can lead the theolo-
gian into fruitful conversation with the
sciences, conversation that "trades in
intellectually satisfying understanding," as
Polkinghorne says, "rather than in logically
coercive demonstration." 17 The sciences
can offer greater insight, corroborating and
possibly correcting theological truths; but
they can never fully "prove" religious
claims. Likewise, theological truths can
enlighten the findings of science, directing
us in their application, explicating their
significance, and even predicting possible
findings. 18 To gain the most from this
dialogue, the theologian must move beyond
the realm of general epistemological and
meta-methodological concerns, and into the
consideration of particular, concrete
observations. 19 In choosing to utilize
conclusions drawn from such dialogues, we
should exercise a good deal of parsimony,
neither too quickly abandoning elements of
the tradition nor too rashly constructing
theories on debated issues in science.
Three themes in conversation with the
sciences
a. The idolatry of anthropomorphism
Personhood is a central aspect in the
Judao-Christian conception of God. God is
portrayed in Scripture as one who feels love,
friendship, anger, and jealousy; as one who
calls, chooses, chastens and engages others.
If our concept of God did not include the
notion of personhood, we should not be able
to engage God as another, as a Thou; we
would cease talking of God's love for us and
of our affection for God. While personhood
seems a formal necessity in our talk of
God,:o it can also lead to the mistake of
conceiving God as too much like ourselves.
We may affirm notions of the omnipresence
of God, but we are unable to imagine a
person without temporal and spatial locality.
Likewise, the affirmation of the omniscience
of God is typically no more than an allegory
of human knowing extended without limit. .
Consequently, the notion of personhood,
conjoined with other divine attributes, leads
us to imagine that God is a personal agent
who attends, intends, desires, knows,
purposes, and acts much as we do, but on a
much grander scale. What Charles Coulson
has labeled the "God of the gaps" is an idol
based on a too-human-like notion of God. 21
These anthropomorphic images have led to
at least two historic clashes between
theology and science, and have eventually
yielded either to the recovery of neglected
elements in the tradition or to the creation of
new models and images of God.
The first instance arose in the cosmo-
logical debates of the seventeenth and
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eighteenth centuries. Spatial images of a
god who literally abides above the Earth in
an immutable sphere of perfection and who.
orders the universe around the theater of
human activity contributed to the resistance
to accepting the Copernican model of the
cosmos. Even after a heliocentric model
was widely accepted, such an accomplished
scientist and theologian as Sir Isaac Newton
could still imagine God as tinkering with the
planets and stars, much as a mechanic would
fine-tune a clockwork. Such an overly
anthropomorphized image of God, as a
causal agent manipulating objects, was
easily dismissed by
Laplace as a superfluous -
hypothesis. 22
The second in-
stance arose in the theo-
logical responses to
Darwin. Scientists and
theologians such as
Frederick Temple, Asa
Gray, B. B. Warfield,
Joseph van Dyke,
W. B. Pope, and J. McCosh, all found
meaning in an evolving universe only
through recourse to an image of God as one
who plans, plants, purposes, directs, guides,
intervenes, and nurtures creation and its
growth in ways allegorical to human activity
in mechanical or horticultural projects..
Those who were best able to accept and
assimilate evolutionary theory were those
who were able to maintain a view of God as
an active creative agent, but without casting
their image of the divine in analogies of an
inattentive watchmaker or an attentive
gardener. Those who could free themselves
from the powerful mythical images of God
as one who fashions figures from clay and
bone were able to integrate evolutionary
theory fully within their theology. Aubrey
Moore, James Iverach, H. W. Beecher, J. R.
Illingsworth, 2? and more recently Pierre
Teilhard de Chardin and Charles Hartshorne
are such theologians. Teilhard and
Hartshorne present novel and progressive
notions of the nature of God, while the
others, at the prodding of the natural
sciences, were perhaps doing no more than
recovering lost aspects of the tradition. In
an often-neglected passage, Calvin asserts
that we may rightly say that "nature is God,"
if we do so with a reverent mind. 24
b. The illusion of self-possession
If the idolatry of anthropomorphism is
the mistake of imagining God as too similar
to ourselves, the illusion of self-possession
is the mistake of supposing too great a
difference between ourselves and the rest of
creation. The illusion of self-possession
suggests that we are transparent to our-
selves, that our desires and behaviors are
controlled by rational reflection, that our
Those who were best able to accept and as-
similate evolutionary theory where those who
were able to maintain a view ofGod as an
active creative agent, but without casting their
image ofthe divine in analogies ofan inatten-
tive watchmaker or an attentive gardener.
being and destiny is a matter to be deter-
mined by conscious deliberation. Recent
theoretical and experimental work in the
sciences confirms the limits of our self-
knowledge and of our relative significance
in the universe.
The illusion of self-possession began to
crumble with the post-modern critique of
epistemology and science. Contemporary
thought in philosophy, science, literary
theory, and critical theory suggests that we
do not belong to ourselves as much as we
belong to traditions, interests, biases and
socially constructed and transmitted
institutions. 25 Likewise, what we do know
as a matter of conscious reflection and focal
attention is meaningful only against the
backdrop of what is known tacitly. 26 At a
fundamental level, the meaning of scientific
language—and all other language-is
"relational, multiple, and does not necessar-
ily involve conscious categorization."27
In a similar vein, recent experimental
work in the physiology and psychology of
perception suggests that "scientific knowl-
edge [of ourselves and our world] is (1)
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limited and relative, (2) social, (3) tacit and
dispersed, and (4) contextually constrained
and value laden." 28 Neuroscientists tell us
that the brain is in some ways "hard wired"
to recognize certain sensory input as
meaningful, to "make decisions," and to
prompt behavior without the input of
conscious deliberation. 29 These neurological
shortcuts have probably arisen to insure the
survival of our species better, but they pay
no homage to the self-identified "I" that
would exercise sovereign control over the
"self." By this account, we are more like
cockroaches-whose legs begin to move
before the message of perceived danger
reaches their brain-than like the masters of
the universe of modern mythology. Recent
advances in psychopharmacology and
neuroscience leave no mistake about the
complicity of mind and body; we are a part
of nature. On our inability fully to compre-
hend ourselves, cognitional theorist apd
naturalist philosopher Colin McGinn seems
to repeat St. Augustine, as quoted earlier,
when he says, "the brain is an object of
perception, laid out in space, containing
spatially distributed processes; but con-
sciousness defies explanation in such terms.
Consciousness does not seem made up out
of smaller spatial processes; yet perception
of the brain seems limited to revealing such
processes." 30
But just as we are part of the natural
order, we are also unquestionably set apart
from it. All the experimenting and theoriz-
ing that has lead to the above conclusions
also serve as demonstration that we are
unique creatures in our ability to ask the
questions of who, what, and where we are.
Still, as regards our relative significance in
the cosmos, geology and astrophysics teach
us that human existence comprises an
infinitesimal portion of time and space. This
does not mean that humans do not hold a
unique position in the universe, but it does
suggest that the extinction of our species
would not much alter the great cosmic
scheme. Some have argued from this
"objective" view for a style of theological
reflection that is truly theocentric rather than
self-referenced. 31
c. Homo religiosus
Where Calvin speaks of the religious
character of human life in theological terms
and Niebuhr explicates the religious
dimension in existential and phenomeno-
logical categories, a case can also be built
for the necessity of religious commitments,
using evidence provided by natural history
and cognitive science.
Neurophysiologist Rodney Holmes
traces the family tree of the genus Homo and
notes the following:
The key to the hominid story is that with each
major increase in the functional ability of a
hominid species, there is a major increase in
cranial capacity. Each hominid takes its name
from its new proficiency: able tool user, erect
explorer, and wise deliberator. The signifi-
cance of each new ability is understood better
in terms of neuroanatomy than in terms of the
skeletal anatomy of each hominid. In the
details of this story one can see an emergent
human character: intelligent, conscious,
imaginative and religious. 32
From these observations, along with insights
from linguistics and neuroscience, Holmes
concludes that we are "fundamentally a
Homo religiosus" and that there is "a
naturalistic justification for the reality of our
interpretation of ourselves as part of
ecology." ?3 That the emergence of neuro-
logical structures responsible for the
creation of religious meaning can be
identified is not cause to dismiss the objects
attended by religious notions, but, rather,
argues for accepting the religious picture of
Ultimate Reality on the basis of natural
history.
Others have traced the meaning-making
activities essential for maintaining a unified
sense of self and world arid for forming the
social relationships essential to human life to
the normative operations of neural struc-
tures.
34
It seems as though the human brain
operates in such a way so as to necessitate
the formation of "myths"-the cognitive
elements of which are set by the environ-
ment, and which secure a pattern of valua-
tion and behavior within a social environ-
ment. Given the ecological reciprocity of
human meaning-making and the environ-
ment, J. Ashbrook concludes that "neutrality
about life-its purposes and processes—is no
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longer an option." 35 Instead, based on the
neurological.evidence we can affirm that:
Religion itself reflects humanity's meaning-
discerning/meaning-constructing participation
in the ecosystem of which it is a part and
which it most fully expresses. Sensory
processes awaken symbolic processes and, in
turn, are shaped by symbolic processes.
...Religion reminds us of God and the soul. It
directs our attention to the depth of experi-
ence. It seeks the value of what is. It insists
upon the relatedness of everything, in a
universe that is to be cherished even as it'gives
birth to Homo sapiens, Homo religiosus.
Conclusion
What, then, can we learn about God
from the sciences? In addition to a renewed
sense of marvel at our creaturely existence
in a complex and orderly universe, we can
learn with assurance that the posture most
appropriate to our species is a religious
orientation that unifies our sense of self and
world and that spurs us to piety.
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